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FOREWORD
This paper is not designed to stake out an absolute and inviolable position on the
future direction of Massachusetts. We do hope to generate further discussion about
what we think is the most important aspect of state public policy - what can help turn the
Massachusetts economy around. Our basic premise is that a sound state fiscal policy is
the sine qua non of the state's economic recovery.
The paper is a sequel to "After the Miracle: A History and Analysis of the
Massachusetts Fiscal Crisis," which we issued in the Spring. Our intent in that earlier
report was simply to present the background and indicate the consequences of the
state's fiscal policies over the last few years.
"After the Revolt: A Framework for Fiscal Recovery" looks forward to the next few
years and foresees escalating deficit spending if major policy changes are not
undertaken. After reviewing the state's fiscal and economic conditions as of October 1
,
1990, the report suggests a framework for fiscal recovery. Specific budgetary targets
are offered. They will be tough medicine for the state to swallow, but we believe that
difficult choices must be made, and that our options grow fewer the longer we wait.
We trust that this paper will be useful both to the incoming Administration and
Legislature in designing a fiscal recovery program and to the citizens of the
Commonwealth in judging the results.
We acknowledge our gratitude to Pat Mullen and Ruth Finn for bringing this effort
to a successful conclusion.
Edmund Beard
Director
John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs
Dedicated to the memory ofour colleague
KERMTTC. MORRISSEY
He really knew the numbers
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite the injection of new taxes in the amount of $1 .2 billion in fiscal 1991 , and recently
announced cuts in the budget of approximately $464 million, the Commonwealth's fiscal
condition -- irrespective of the outcome of CLT's petition -- is precarious. Although the
political juices are flowing in Massachusetts, with an eye on November 6th,
Massachusetts decision-makers have not faced up to the problems inherent in the long-
term, structural spending patterns of the state's budget.
Our five-year budget projection indicates that if expenditure trends continue without
dramatic restructuring - particularly in the "non-discretionary" accounts -- the
Commonwealth faces a steady rise in annual deficits that could exceed $700 million in
fiscal 1993 and may escalate beyond $1.3 billion by 1995. Between now and 1995, total
expenditures are estimated to increase by 32%, whereas revenues will grow by only
24%.
The most recent news from the Governor is that another round of employee layoffs must
be initiated and that more services will be cut. Just a week ago the Governor announced
that some MDC skating rinks will be closed along with one of the state's zoos;
supportive services for certain people on welfare will be cut; and home care for the
elderly, job training programs, prenatal and postnatal nutrition care and college
scholarships would be substantially reduced. While these cuts are painful, it should be
noted that this year's spending program is above last year's expenditure by
approximately $20 million.
What is driving this uncontrolled expenditure growth are the well-known, notorious
"Budget Busters" -- Medicaid, MBTA (and regional transit) subsidies, Pensions, Group
Insurance and Debt Service. These items ate up 32.3% of the budget in 1990, and are
projected to require 38% of the budget in 1991 . By 1995 they are likely to claim 45.7%.
For every dollar of new revenue the state receives between now and 1995, about 90
cents will be needed for these "Budget Busters."
Over the past three years, the Administration and Legislature have carried out a
spending strategy that essentially balanced budgets by chipping away at the so-called
discretionary items - accounting for about half of the state's expenditure budget - while
treating the "budget busters," -- that consume two out of every five revenue dollars - as
legally-bound commitments requiring longer-term restructuring. To date, however, the
enactment and implementation of fundamental changes in entitlements, contractual
arrangements, subsidies and fixed charges have been limited to trimming their budget
allocations around the edges -- to mandating gradual revisions through the use of
outside budget sections -- while avoiding basic overhaul of their authorizing legislation.
This budget strategy has reduced state support for higher education from FY88 to FY91
by $125 million, a cut of over 16%. Direct local aid is 12% below the level of two years
ago. Home care for the elderly is down by 15% over 1989. There are substantially fewer
subsidized day care slots than two years ago. Swimming pools were closed this past
summer. Workforce reductions nave particularly affected the Governor's office, the
Legislature, several constitutional offices (Attorney-General, Auditor and Secretary of
State), the Departments of Education, Communities and Development, Public Health and
Public Works, and the state police.
Meanwhile, welfare recipients and state retirees have gone three years without cost-of-
living adjustments. State employees have been working without collective bargaining
agreements for 18 months, and state agency managers have not had salary increases
since 1986.
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Whether the CLT-High Tech petition is approved or not, the newly-elected Administration
and Legislature will need the 6-month period from January-June 1991 to formulate and
begin implementation of a detailed plan to restructure the state government, a plan that
reflects the voters' concerns about the state's economy, taxes and out-of-control costs.
A fiscal recovery plan must contain the following ingredients if it is to demonstrate
sensitivity to the public call for budget stability and relief from tax escalation, and if it is to
avert the escalating deficits projected for the period, 1992-95.
1
.
Tax policy changes that are consistent with the competitive requirements of a
state economy dominated by professional services, high technology, high-
wage manufacturing and relatively high per capita personal income.
2. Future tax revenue estimates that reflect the recent gloomy predictions of the
State Department of Revenue, and a general consensus of economists that
the state's economy will begin to rebound slowly, at best, in late 1992.
3. Careful review of the state's "big-ticket" entitlement, contractual, subsidy and
fixed charge expenditures, mainly "budget busters" that are driven by both
statutory and budgetary policy constraints, and which hold the key to
bringing the state's costs into line with available resources. These cannot
be treated as "off the table," "non-discretionary" accounts.
4. New budgetary targets that cap annual percentage increases for the "budget
busters" to add critical budgetary discipline to adopted and pending
statutory and administrative reforms designed to curb the upward trend of
"budget-buster" costs.
Our proposed fiscal recovery plan is tough medicine. It requires the following actions:
in
1.
The Commonwealth, vulnerable to the potentially negative impact of recently-
enacted sales and income tax increases on a stagnant economy, will
initiate a 3-year gradual tax reduction plan totalling $1 billion, effective on
July 1, 1991 and ending on June 30, 1994, and containing the following
steps:
a. Repealing the new sales tax on selective professional services to
businesses and miscellaneous services.
b. Reducing prevailing income tax rates applicable to the 1993 and
1994 fiscal years and subsequent years by $700 million in two
steps, in order to restore the state's income tax rates to more
competitive interstate levels.
2. Modifying annual property tax levy limits, and exempting debt service on
newly-issued municipal debt from the limits (so that cities and towns would
have access to an additional $300 million a year in property taxes) and
increasing the proportion of lottery receipts distributed to cities and towns
by reducing the proportions for prizes and administration (bringing
Massachusetts more into line with the experience of other large states).
3. Holding "budget buster" growth to percentage targets which reflect sharply
reduced rates of increases in these accounts, while direct local aid is level
funded and "all other" categories of state government are reduced by 2%
for FY1992. As tax revenues are projected to improve by modest
percentages during the next three years, budgets for direct local aid and
"all other" categories should receive commensurate annual percentage
increases.
The implications of such a drastic budget strategy for state services will be far-reaching.
The alternative ~ continued deficit spending ~ will drag the state down to insolvency.
IV
Whether or not the state's voters approve the CLT-High Tech initiative petition that would
roll back up to $2.3 billion in revenues and/or the petition of the Massachusetts
Municipal Association that would require 40% of the state's largest taxes to be paid
annually to cities and towns as local aid (thereby increasing local aid by $1 .2 billion in
FY92), the next Administration and Legislature cannot avoid putting every expenditure
"on the table" and raising tough questions about everything on which the state spends
money, including:
Who should be eligible for Medicaid and for state support in nursing homes when the
proportion of elderly in Massachusetts nursing homes is far above the national average
and when Massachusetts spends much more than the national average for nursing
home Medicaid patients?
How many of the Medicaid options should be provided when only a handful of states
including Massachusetts provides a full menu of options?
When will mentally retarded patients be shifted from institutions to community-based
facilities -- after more than 25 years of state policy emphasizing de-institutionalization?
Should MBTA fares, lowest of any urban transit system in the nation, be raised to cover
at least one-third of MBTA expenses?
Should the state continue to operate zoos in view of its historically poor performance and
limited resources?
Whether our current systems of two-year and four-year state colleges may require
institutional consolidation in view of the state's declining college-age population?
Is a publicly subsidized maritime academy warranted when the state no longer has
significant maritime economic interests?
Is a state subsidy for professional education of veterinarians in a private institution
justifiable?
Should the missions of a sworn Capitol Police force, essentially providing building
security services, be re-examined in the context of escalating demand for more crime-
fighting police officers?
Are the number and distribution of 70 district courts outdated in light of significant
changes in population densities, transportation access and caseloads?
Until now the tendency has been to reduce budgets by merely doing less or having
fewer service recipients. A number of explanations have been offered as to why major
reforms cannot be undertaken, i.e.: it will take more money to save money; the
Legislature will not amend the authorizing statute; the affected client group is too large
and too vocal. Such excuses wear thin as the state's economy flounders.
VI
AFTER THE REVOLT: A FRAMEWORK FOR FISCAL RECOVERY
Will the Miracle Ever Revive?
Why prepare an epilogue to the Massachusetts drama, "After the Miracle," as we
had promised in May? An epilogue is rendered after the conclusion of a play. The
curtain for the final act of this political tragedy cannot come down until the state's newly-
elected constitutional officers and members of the General Court have taken their oaths
of office in January 1991.
In a real sense, the final curtain cannot come down because despite the
Governor's recent optimistic proclamation that revival of the miracle had begun, the
Commonwealth's short-term fiscal problem has not been resolved. In the absence of
firm fiscal discipline, state spending for big-ticket items continues to spin out of control.
State tax revenues defy more prudent forecasts as indicated in collections for July-
September of the new fiscal year.
Moreover, long-term prospects for economic and fiscal recovery are clouded by
the distinct possibility that the state's voters might approve initiative petitions on
November 6, 1990, the fiscal impact of which will severely exacerbate the dimensions of
the state's current problem. Meanwhile, the state primary election returns of September
18th provided clear-cut evidence that a majority of voters were unhappy with the
incumbent political establishment and identified state taxes and the economy as their
leading concerns.
Recap: FY 1987-90
Lagging Economy . The latest numbers dramatize the precipitous recent decline in
the state's economy:
1. The unemployment rate in Massachusetts has climbed to 6.7% (August, 1990)
compared with 3.7% only 16 months before.
2. Employment growth in Massachusetts during the 12-month period between July
1990 and the year before actually declined by 3%, reflecting a loss of over 90,000 jobs,
compared with an employment growth rate of about 2% a year since the early 1980s.
3. Growth in the state's total personal income for the first quarter of 1990 was
below personal income growth for the nation as a whole, a new and disturbing trend; for
almost a decade, per capita personal income in Massachusetts was substantially above
the national average.
4. Forecasts of growth rates for personal income, employment, unemployment,
housing starts and net outmigration, compounded by higher levels of inflation and
soaring oil prices as a result of the Mideast crisis and the steep plunge in consumer
confidence as shown by weak retail sales, indicate that the Massachusetts economy is
not likely to revive until late 1992 at the earliest.
Deteriorating State Finances: An Overview . The state's finances over the past four years
(FY 87-90) have had all the earmarks of a floating "craps game." On the spending side,
authorizations have been a crazy quilt of line items in the annual general appropriations
act, off-budget spending of retained revenues, spending from continuing accounts,
(authorizations carried over from the prior year), supplementary appropriations,
deficiency appropriations and non-appropriated distributions, offset from time to time by
allotment withholdings, appropriation vetoes, and appropriation reversions.
The revenue side of the state's fiscal planning process resembles a continuing
"shell game,'' conducted quarterly or more frequently as actual tax revenue collections
fall behind original estimates and constitutional requirements for budgetary balance
dictate knee-jerk revisions of revenue estimates plus a resort to the use of fund
balances, inter-fund transfers and accounting adjustments to bolster available receipts
and balance the books. It should be noted, moreover, that the state's finance statutes
do not require legislative adoption of the state's revenue estimates as part of the annual
fiscal plan as they do require definitive legislative appropriations to spend. Further
confusing the tax revenue forecasting dilemma is the current mechanism for revenue
estimation, which is legally under control of the Department of Administration and
Finance, whose track record, based on technical advice and counsel from the State
Department of Revenue and the Advisory Board on Revenue Resources and the State
Economy, has been far off the mark since June 1987. (See Table 1
.)
The Commonwealth has lost heavily in these floating craps and shell games over
the past four years. Between the 1987 and 1990 fiscal years, on the budgetary basis of
accounting as defined by current state finance law, the state's principal operating funds
(general, local aid and highway) have been in the red by amounts ranging from $300
million a year in 1987 (equivalent to 3% of total revenues) to over $1 .2 billion (10% of total
revenues) in 1990. The annual budgetary deficit during this period skyrocketed by over
300%. Although revenues between the 1987 and 1990 fiscal years grew by $1.3 billion
or almost 12%, expenditures escalated by $2.2 billion or over 19%. (See Table 2.)
To close the $1 .8 billion in gaps between operating revenues and expenditures
over the last two years, to cover an accumulation of unpaid Medicaid bills of past years
(totaling over $600 million) and to finance a Supreme Judicial Court judgment against the
state in tax cases ($23 million), the Commonwealth has borrowed to date and will be
borrowing during the current fiscal year a total of $2.4 billion in notes and bonds. This
debt, which will not pay for any useful state assets, will cost over $600 million in interest
expense, bond insurance premiums (to enhance sale of the state's bonds) and letters-
of-credit fees (to secure the payment by credit-issuing banks of principal and interest
due on notes and bonds in case of Commonwealth default). The $600 million would
have been more than enough to meet the state's 10% federal matching requirement for
the $5 billion Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project.
Not only has Massachusetts been forced to rely increasingly on above-average
interest rates, bond insurance and letters of credit to market note and bond issues in an
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effort to offset the lowest-in-the-nation state credit rating, it has also been forced to
pledge and dedicate proportions of tax receipts as further guarantees of debt repayment
for deposit in euphemistically-labelled trust funds from which the debt service would be
paid. The Commonwealth Liability Reduction Fund and the Medical Assistance Liability
Fund were established in the 1990 fiscal year to receive deposits of the temporary
income tax increase of 15% on certain salaries and wages. The Commonwealth Fiscal
Recovery Fund was established in the 1991 fiscal year to receive deposits equivalent to
15% of all personal income tax collections.
FY 1990: The Gory Details . If the major fiscal decisions and modifications for the 1990
fiscal year were plotted on a graph, the line would look like a giant roller coaster.
Spending authorizations and revenue adjustments bolted wildly between January 25,
1989 when the Governor submitted his original budget proposal of $13.5 billion and
August 1, 1990, when the Governor signed the largest deficit funding bailout bill in the
history of the Commonwealth, "An Act Providing for Certain Fiscal Requirements of the
Commonwealth" (c.151 of the Acts of 1990).
In authorizing the so-called Commonwealth Fiscal Recovery Loan bond issues of
$1 .4 billion for financing the FY 1990 bondable deficit of $1 .3 billion in the state's general
and local aid funds and for financing another $126 million in unpaid Medicaid bills of prior
fiscal years, this statute finally made possible the closing of the Commonwealth's
accounts for 1990, thereby ending the wild revenue and expenditure gyrations. (See
Table 3 for a fiscal chronology of the 1990 fiscal year.)
State Fiscal Plan for 1991 : Replay of 1990?
Tax Fix . Two weeks before he signed the unprecedented $1.4 billion bond authorization
bill, which finally resolved the 1990 fiscal problem, the Governor approved a record-
breaking tax revenue increase measure, culminating nine months of rancorous
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legislative debate. This tax compromise was designed to provide funds over the next
seven years to cover debt service requirements on the state's Fiscal Recovery Loans
(funding the 1990 bondable deficit) and to provide sufficient additional tax revenues to
balance the adopted FY 1991 spending program, then estimated at $13.8 billion.
Approved by only 4 votes in the House of Representatives and by 5 votes in the Senate,
the tax legislation, according to EOAF estimates of August 15, 1990, will result in
additional revenue from higher income, sales and gasoline taxes of $1 .162 billion (plus
$50 million in accelerated corporate tax payments) in the 1991 fiscal year and $1 .680
billion during the 1992 fiscal year. For FY 1991 , however, 83% of the estimated
additional tax yield will not be realized until the latter half of the fiscal year.
Below is a summary of the principal components of the new tax program:
- Personal income tax rates are increased retroactively to January 1 , 1990. On
interest (excluding Massachusetts bank interest), dividends and capital gains, 1
the tax rate is increased from 10% to 12%; on all other types of income, the tax
rate for 1990 is increased from 5.75% to 5.95%.2
-- For 1991, the income tax rate of 5.95 will increase to 6.25% and revert in 1992
and subsequent years to 5.95%.
-- Sales excise tax statutes are amended to apply the current 5% tax rate effective
December 1, 1990, to legal, accounting, engineering and architectural services
provided to most businesses in amounts larger than $20,000 per year and to a
number of general services, mainly applicable to businesses.
- The motor fuel or gasoline tax is increased effective July 28, 1990 by six cents
(from 1 1 to 17 cents) and by another four cents (to 21 cents) on January 1 , 1991
.
1The current deduction of 50% of net capital gains is retained, resulting in an effective
capital gains rate of 6%.
2The tax rate for unemployment compensation, alimony, Mass. bank interest, rental
income from real estate, pension and annuity income and IRA/Keogh distributions is
maintained at 5%.
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Income Tax $742.0
Sales Tax 192.6
Motor Fuel Tax 177.0
A breakdown of estimated additional revenues by tax source (excluding $50 million
in accelerated corporate taxes) is shown below:
FY91 FY92
(in millions)
$1,037.0
376.2
263.0
The fiscal 1991 budget approved by the Legislature had been based on projected
tax revenues of $9,748 billion. Early in September the Secretary of Administration and
Finance scaled down these tax revenue estimates to $9,594 billion, a reduction of $154
million in the face of the continuing slide in tax collections during July and August, 1990
totalling about $30 million as compared with the benchmarks originally established by
the State Department of Revenue. Late in September, reacting to projections of a
worsening state economy, the State Department of Revenue further modified the revised
estimate to a new total of $9,227 billion.
There are a number of factors that render tenuous even the latest tax revenue
projection of $9.2 billion for the current fiscal year, not only because of the sliding
economy, but because of the sales tax extension to services:
1
.
Adding the sales excise tax to broad categories of professional services is a brand
new tax venture for Massachusetts. State Department of Revenue forecasters do not
have actual collection experience to guide them in their analysis of projected yields.
2. The $20,000 exemption opens the door to creative techniques that lawyers,
accountants, engineers and architects and their clients may devise to evade the sales
tax.
Moreover, the tax yield from professional services may be adversely affected by the
administrative nuisance of the intricate exemptions - the tax applies to businesses within
the state but not to services for out-of-state clients, raising the issue of client
confidentiality betrayal in the case of legal services; services for individuals are exempt;
exemption of the first $20,000 of bills could result in taxpayer confusion, i.e. a small
business has legal bills totalling $25,000 from two law firms, one for $15,000 and the
other for $10,000: how will the $5,000 in legal services subject to the tax be prorated
between the two firms?
3. Despite the split-decision advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court that
extending the sales tax to services was constitutional, several legal challenges have
been launched by professional associations of attorneys and accountants and by a
statewide taxpayers group which argue that the state constitution limits the sales tax to
"commodities" and which question the constitutionality of extending the corollary "use"
tax to services. In addition, a major metropolitan newspaper is disputing a separate
amendment of the sales tax statute that takes away from newspapers the exemption of
the sales tax from the purchase of equipment used in newspaper publishing, arguing
that the tax was unconstitutional and discriminatory, in violation of the freedom of the
press under the state and U.S. constitutions.3
The Revenue Plan . According to revised estimates for the 1991 fiscal year made by the
Secretary of Administration and Finance late in September 1990, total revenues of the
state's principal operating funds, including estimated additional taxes from the recently-
enacted tax bill, will total $13,288 billion, as detailed in Table 4.
The initial projected tax revenues for FY1991, made in August but excluding
estimated yields from the new tax increases and reflecting continued slowing of the
economy, had been based on the following assumptions of the state's Advisory Board of
3Only 3 other states (Hawaii, South Dakota and New Mexico) apply their sales taxes to
legaiservices.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED STATE REVENUES. FY 1991
( in millions)
Tax Revenges 1 Estimates
"
Income Tax $5,183.74
Sales Tax 1 ,982.6
Corporate Excise 602.0
Non-Business Corporate2 407.7
Other Excises3 1 ,051 .5
Total Taxes $ 9,227.5
Non-Tax Revenues
Federal Reimbursements $2,014.4
Departmental and Other Revenues 1 ,275.2
Interfund Transfers & Other Sources 770.9
Total Non-Tax Revenues $ 4,060.5
Total Revenues $ 13,288.0s
Source: Executive Office of Administration and Finance.
* As of September 30, 1990.
1 Tax revenues exclude $56.6 million in other state taxes accounted for in other budgetary funds.
2 Includes bank, insurance and public utility issues.
3 Includes motor fuels, cigarette, estate, alcoholic beverage, room occupancy, deeds and miscellaneous
excises.
4 Excludes $444.5 million estimated to result in FY90 from temporary increase in income tax dedicated to
Commonwealth Liability Reduction Fund (covering FY89 deficit ) and Medical Assistance Liability Fund
(covering payment of prior year Medicaid bills), and $293.9 million estimated to result in FY91 from income
tax increase dedicated to Commonwealth Fiscal Recovery Loan Fund.
5 Excludes $1 .3098 billion for prior-year debt financing.
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Revenue Resources and the State Economy: income tax revenues would increase by a
modest 3%, sales tax revenues would grow only slightly by 0.7%, while business
corporation tax revenues would fall by 9.3% and tax revenues from banks by 18.7%.
The September downward revisions totalling $464 million in tax revenues mean that the
original assumptions have been abandoned.
The Spending Plans . The legislative disarray that characterized the debate in the
General Court from May to mid-July 1990 over state tax policy spilled over into
simultaneous and subsequent disagreements over spending totals, allocations, priorities
and savings for the 1991 fiscal year.
Legislative activity on the Governor's budget for FY1991 did not intensify until May
because, unlike past years, the Governor had refrained from recommending additional
taxes and the emphasis was on crafting a tax revenue package that would not only meet
the financing requirements for the prior year's deficit but would close the gap between
eroding tax revenues and built-in spending increases for the 1991 and subsequent fiscal
years.
The Governor's proposed budget for 1991, submitted to the General Court on
January 24, 1990, totalled $12.9 billion. It had been based on the assumption of no tax
increases, although it did include a "current service" budget as an expression of his
distaste for the no-tax budget that he called "a disgrace". Budgetary ping-pong between
the executive and legislative branches began in May, 1990 when the House of
Representatives passed and sent to the Senate a budget of about $13.9 billion (including
anticipated debt service in FY1991 for the forthcoming deficit bond authorization) and
based on its previous passage of collateral increases in income and gasoline taxes.
In June, 1990, the Senate enacted a budget of $13.7 billion but substituted a tax
package that shifted the emphasis from higher income taxes to extending the state sales
tax to services. After both branches of the Legislature had enacted a compromise tax
bill providing for an estimated $1.2 billion in increased income, sales, and gasoline taxes
12
for FY1991 and an additional $1 .8 billion for FY1992 early in July, a budget conference
committee late in July recommended an alternative budget based on the enacted tax bill.
Whereupon the House of Representatives, sensitive to charges that the budget was still
several hundred million dollars out of balance, erupted in revolt over the budget
conference committee's report, finally rejecting it.
Opposing further tax revenue adjustments offered by the House Committee on
Ways and Means, the conference committee recommended across-the-board
decreases of 4% in so-called discretionary budgetary accounts, thereby cutting
appropriation requests by another $265 million and enacting on July 28th a total budget
of $13,967 billion, which included $167 million in additional anticipated spending
provided for in the overall budgetary plan for FY1991
.
4 The Governor gave final approval
on August 1 to the 1991 general appropriations act after vetoing 34 budgetary line items,
disapproving the language in four items and returning four budget sections to the
Legislature for amendment.
The ink on the Governor's signature was hardly dry, however, when disappointing
tax revenues in July, down by 1.6% from the same month in 1989, and again in August,
when tax collections were over $27 million or 4.6% below the estimates for that month
(not the projected increase of 4.8% over August 1989), prompted the Governor to order
further budget reductions of $154 million on September 4, thereby reducing the state's
spending plan for FY91 to $13.8 billion. On September 25th, the Governor ordered
additional reductions in appropriations totalling $310 million, acting upon the pessimistic
outlook made by the State Department of Revenue as to economic trends and their
impact on future tax revenues. The latest tax revenue estimates reflect a decrease of
4To meet operating expense requirements in July, the Legislature passed two interim
appropriation acts ancftemporary notes were issued to provide the necessary cash. The
4% cut was applied to $6.8 billion of proposed spending and excluded so-called legally-
mandated expenditures and reimbursable expenditures.
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about $374 million or 4.4% from the baseline tax revenue total of $8.5 billion collected in
the past year.
Little seems to have changed. The state's budget and tax revenue pictures are still
in disarray.
Another Operating Deficit? The state's 1991 spending plan as of October 1 , 1990 totals
$13,451.0 million, while revenues are estimated at $13,288.0 million, indicating a deficit of
$183.0 million after only three months into the 1991 fiscal year. Tax collections in July
and August 1990 were $30 million below the benchmarks of the State Department of
Revenue.
In September tax collections fell short of revised benchmarks by another $15
million as sales tax and corporate tax proceeds continued to lag badly behind revised
projections. And if past experience is repeated, supplementary appropriations could
add substantially to the state's current spending plan.
The state's short-term fiscal problem is due to the fact that the economy no longer
generates tax revenue growth. The state's more serious longer-term fiscal dilemma is
attributable to a state spending pattern that grows faster than its resources.
A Grim Outlook for the Future
Using the most recent (October 1, 1990) revenue and expenditure estimates for the
1991 fiscal year as our baseline for projecting state revenues and expenditures over a 5-
year period (FY91-95), we have prepared Table 5 to show the dimensions of the state's
structural gap between estimates of reasonable levels of revenue and tax growth and
projected expenditures for the next four years.
The Senate Committee on Ways and Means, as part of its FY1991 budget
recommendations released on June 1990, prepared a 5-year budget projection (FY91-
95) based on assumptions that additional revenues would not be forthcoming and that
spending reductions would not be made. According to the projections of the
14
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Committee, total revenue would increase by an average of 5.5% each year and tax
revenue by an average of 6.0% each year. Our own revenue projections are similar -
5.9% annually for total revenue and 5.1% each year for tax revenue, but we have based
our estimates for the FY91 baseline year and for FY92 on the expected yields from the
recently-enacted tax legislation.
As for expenditures, the Senate Committee estimated that they would grow by a
total of 7.9% in FY91 and by an average of 6.4% each year from FY92 to FY95 if current
levels of service were to be maintained. Our expenditure projections are based on more
recent figures for the FY91 base year than were available to the Committee. These
reflect budget reductions totalling over $700 million for FY91 but maintain the assumption
about current levels of service. According to our projections, total expenditures would
grow by an average of 6.4% between the 1991 and 1995 fiscal years. For major
expenditure categories, including the budget busters, we have adopted the Committee's
year-to-year percentage estimates and applied them to our FY91 base period. These
indicate that Medicaid and Group Insurance, for example, will increase by an annual
average of 15%, MBTA subsidies by over 11%, pensions by 5.5%, public assistance and
debt service by 5%, "all other" expenditures by over 3.4% and direct local aid by 2%.5
Thus the 5-year budget projections in Table 5 reveal that if expenditure trends
continue without drastic change, particularly the steep upward trends in so-called non-
discretionary accounts, mainly in the large budget busters, the Commonwealth faces a
steady rise in annual deficits that could exceed $700 million by 1993 and escalate
beyond $1 .3 billion by 1995. Between the 1991 and 1995 fiscal years, total expenditures
are estimated to increase by 32% whereas revenues will grow by only 24%, even with the
comprehensive tax increase package that will provide over $1 .6 billion in additional
estimated revenues in the 1992 fiscal year.
5See the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, "Fiscal Year 1991 Budget Recom-
mendations, Budgeting for Economic Recovery", June, 1990, p. 1-9-11.
*
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"Budget Buster" Termites: Still Gnawing Away
That the so-called budget-busters were growing at extraordinary annual rates is
evident from the percentage changes for the FY87-91 period, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Estimated Expenditure Trend bv Maior Cateaorv
FY 1987-91
Expenditure Category %Overall Chanae
% Average
Annual Change
Direct Local Aid + 0.2% + .05%
Medicaid + 83.8% + 20.9%
Group Health Insurance + 100.3% + 25.1%
Public Assistance + 34.0% + 8.5%
Debt Service + 64.2% + 16.0%
Pensions + 13.4% + 3.4%
MBTA + 68.4% + 17.1%
All Others + 1.9% + 0.5%
Total + 19.7% + 4.9%
Moreover, as indicated in Table 7, the FY91 budget allocations for Medicaid, group
insurance for state employees and retirees, debt service on short-term and long-term
borrowing, employee pension costs for state employees, and state subsidies to the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation and regional transit authorities will increase by over
$780 million or 19% over the prior year (FY90) as contrasted with spending for all other
major budget categories (direct local aid, public assistance and "all other"), the total
budgets of which will decline by over $760 million or 8.4%.
17
If our expenditure projections hold up, Medicaid could approach $4.7 billion by the
1995 fiscal year, an extraordinary increase of 220% over 1987 costs. Group health
insurance is expected to exceed $800 million by 1995, or 250% over the 1987 level. Debt
service could climb above $1 billion, more than double the cost in 1987. Subsidies for
the MBTA and regional transit authorities would grow to $647 million, or 165% above the
1987 expenditure. By 1995 pension expenditures will hit $900 million, 72% above the
cost in 1987. Between the 1987 and 1991 fiscal years, the rising cost of pensions had
slowed down to an average increase of just over 3% a year by adoption of a fully-funded
pension system the annual costs of which had been spread out over 40 years, with lower
costs during the early years of the new system.
Although a myriad of outside budget sections in appropriation legislation of the last
two years has been enacted to curb the upward spiral of the budget busters, because of
laggard implementation of measures to control these costs, exacerbated by federal and
state laws and standards that impede cost control efforts, and the reality that cost
containment of the larger budget busters require longer periods to realize reductions, the
budget busters are expected to continue their dramatic rise.
In fiscal 1991 the budget busters account for 38.1% of total spending compared
with 32.3% in the prior year. By 1995, they are likely to claim 45.7% of the total. The
budget busters are projected to increase by 58.6% by FY95 while all other accounts,
including direct local aid and public assistance, will rise by only 15.7%. By 1995,
Medicaid will absorb over 26% of the state's total spending compared with 20% in fiscal
1991. By contrast, cities and towns will see their direct local aid decline from 19% of total
state spending this year to 16% in fiscal 1995. (See Table 7.)
Appropriation levels for the current (1991) fiscal year demonstrate that the
Governor and Legislature have ignored the warnings of the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means that budget buster authorizations must not only be drastically reduced to
balance the budget even after taxes are raised, but their upward spending rates must be
18
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controlled lest inappropriately large reductions become necessary in other budget
accounts and there be no budgetary margin for dealing with future state needs.
A Proposed Fiscal Recovery Plan
What is crystal clear from the analysis in this report, which corrobates the
conclusions of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, is that the Commonwealth
faces a steadily deteriorating fiscal condition over the next five years even if the voters
reject the Committee for Limited Taxation (CLT)--High Tech Council initiative petition to
roll back state taxes and fees to the June 30, 1988 levels. The evidence is mounting that
the recently-created record-breaking tax package along with a second round of heavy
borrowing to fund accumulated operating deficits will not achieve the state's goal of
restoring badly-needed stability to state finances in the near term.
Whether the CLT-High Tech petition is approved or not, the newly-elected
Administration and Legislature will need the 6-month period from January-June 1991 to
formulate and initiate implementation of a detailed plan to re-structure the state
government, a plan that reflects the voters' concerns about the state's economy, taxes
and out-of-control costs, and that takes into consideration the tax revenue collections for
the last quarter of calendar 1990 and tax revenue projections.
A fiscal recovery plan must contain the following ingredients if it is to demonstrate
sensitivity to the public mood for budget stability and relief from tax escalation, and if it is
to avert the escalating deficits projected for the 1992-95 fiscal years:
1
.
Tax policy changes that are consistent with the competitive requirements of a
state economy dominated by professional services, high technology, high-wage
manufacturing and relatively high per capita personal income.
2. Future tax revenue estimates that are predicated on the recent gloomy
predictions of the State Department of Revenue and on a general consensus of
economists that the state's economy will rebound slowly.
20
3. The state's big-ticket entitlement, contractual, subsidy and fixed charge
expenditures, mainly budget busters that are driven by both statutory and budgetary
policy constraints, hold the key to bringing the state's costs into line with available
resources, and must be the major focus of future short-term and longer-term budget
planning. These non-discretionary accounts can no longer be "off the table."
4. New budgetary targets that cap annual percentage increases for the budget
busters are needed to reinforce budgetary discipline contained in adopted and pending
statutory and administrative reforms designed to curb the upward trend of budget-buster
costs.
Our proposed fiscal recovery plan, shown in Table 8, is tough medicine. It abides
by the above criteria and reflects the following assumptions:
1
.
The Commonwealth, vulnerable to the potentially negative impact of recently-
enacted sales and income tax increases on a stagnant economy, will initiate a 3-year
gradual tax reduction plan totalling $1 billion effective on July 1, 1991 and ending on
June 30, 1995 which contains the following steps:
a. Repealing the new sales tax on selective professional services to businesses and
on miscellaneous services, thereby reducing tax revenue estimates for FY92 and
subsequent years by about $350 million and eliminating a new tax that attacks the heart
of the state's economy.
b. Reducing prevailing income tax rates applicable to the 1993 and 1994 fiscal
years by $700 million (by $350 million each year) in order to restore the state's income
tax rates on both earned and unearned income to more competitive interstate levels.
2. Modifying annual property tax levy limits and exempting debt service on newly-
issued municipal debt from the limits so that cities and towns would have access to an
additional $300 million a year in property taxes and increasing the proportion of lottery
receipts distributed to cities and towns by reducing the proportions for prizes and
administration (bringing Massachusetts more into line with the experience of other large
21
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states) 6 These changes would offset the declines in direct local aid in FY90 and FY91
and proposed level-funding of direct local aid in FY92.
3. Table 9 shows what we propose as percentage targets for each budget category
in each of the years, FY92-95. We emphasize that the targets are relative to recent
trends and can be modified to meet alternative value judgements as to allocation of
resources.
4. The proposed budget for the 1992 fiscal year in our recovery plan is the most
difficult to balance. It is based on the following assumptions: (a) that there will be no
growth in the tax revenue baseline of $8.5 billion for FY91
,
(b) that the estimated
additional yield of $564.6 million from the higher income and gasoline taxes mandated by
the 1990 tax legislation will be collected plus an estimated 8% increase in nontax
revenues, but (c) these revenue additions will be offset by our proposed repeal of the
sales tax on services.
6ln Massachusetts (for calendar 1989), 30.2% of the $1.5 billion from lottery receipts
represented net income (after deductions of prizes, commissions and administrative
expenses), which is well below the percentage of lottery net income for the U.S. as a
whole (38.9%) and for such large states as California (38.5%), N.Y. (43.1%), Florida
(39.5%) and Pennsylvania (41.0%).
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TABLE 9
PROPOSED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES OVER PRIOR FISCAL YEAR
Fiscal Year
Expenditure Category 22 22 94 25
Direct Local Aid — +2% +4% + 5%
Medicaid + 7% +7% +7% +7%
Public Assistance +3% +3% +5% +5%
Debt Service +9% +8% +3% +3%
Pensions +6.6% +6% +6% +6%
Group Insurance +7% +6% +6% +6%
MBTA and Regional Transit + 5% +5% + 5% +6%
All Other -2% + 1% +3% +3%
In FY92 the five budget busters are held to sharply reduced rates of increase
while direct local aid is level-funded and the "all other" category must be reduced by
another 2% in order to balance the budget. It should be noted that legislative
modification of the property tax limits as recommended would be equivalent to a 10%
rise in direct local aid.
5. The proposed budget for FY93 anticipates a slight improvement in tax revenues
of 2% along with a 6.4% increase in non-tax revenues and begins to rebuild gradually the
appropriations for expenditure categories that had either been previously cut below the
baseline year of 1991 or level-funded, as in the case of direct local aid.
6. In light of the projected increase of 3% in tax revenues and a 6.5% estimated
increase in non-tax revenues, the proposed budget for FY94 begins to restore
appropriations in the "all other" category.
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7. The proposed budget for FY95 maintains the steady improvement in
appropriation levels based on the expectation that a stronger economy will bolster tax
revenues by an estimated 4%.
Budoet Targets for Budget Busters: FY92-95
If the five budget busters are not restrained and kept in check, the proposed fiscal
recovery plan will quickly fall apart. Prior efforts to contain their upward spiral by
mandated statutory and administrative reductions in services, program design changes
and special mechanisms to control costs have had limited results. For example, the
Governor's original Medicaid budget for FY91 assumed over $700 million in reductions
through legislative amendments and waivers of federal regulations. The final Medicaid
budget for the current fiscal year is $2,671 .3 million, 26% above the prior year's
estimated expenditure.
Anticipating the political difficulties and counteracting cost-driving forces that
propel the budget busters, we felt it necessary to push for the concept suggested by the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means that would establish budgetary targets limiting
the annual percentage increases in budgetary allocations to the budget busters:
(1) bringing the annual rise in Medicaid budgets down to 7% over the FY92-95 period;
(2) reducing the FY92 increase in the Group Insurance budget to 7% and for subsequent
years of the recovery period to 6%; (3) including a 9% increase for FY92 and an 8%
increase for FY92 in debt service, and a reduced increase of about 3% for both FY94
and FY95; (4) continuing the average yearly rise of just over 6% for pensions throughout
the next four years; and (5) bringing down the increase in the state's subsidies for mass
transit to 5% during the FY92-95 period.
If it becomes clear that caps on annual percentage increases reinforced by legal
and administrative reforms fail to bring the budgets of Medicaid, Group Insurance and
transit subsidies down to the desired targets, it may be necessary, as the Senate
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Committee on Ways and Means concluded, to undertake complete re-drafts of the
legislative authorizations underlying these programs. (It should be noted that the
Governor vetoed an outside section of the FY91 appropriations act that would have
moved in this direction. It would have terminated any Medicaid benefits not required
under federal law if Medicaid program expenditures exceeded 18.25% of total state
spending and would have required the MBTA to raise any expenditures in excess of
2.75% of total state spending from its own source revenues.)
A similar outside section strategy to place into a kind of "administrative
receivership" a number of less costly budget accounts with excessive growth since FY88
spending levels and patterns of inefficient management plus increased demand similar to
the budget busters was not vetoed by the Governor, however. The Legislature
prescribed an oversight process for the following appropriations -- workmen's
compensation, the Committee for Public Counsel Services, emergency assistance by the
Department of Public Welfare, and the Turning 22 programs managed by Mental Health,
Mental Retardation, the Executive Office of Human Services, the Mass. Rehabilitation
Commission and the Mass. Commission for the Blind -- under which overall
management, operations, case management, eligibility criteria, regulations, etc., would
be given special scrutiny and evaluation.
Medicaid
If legislative reforms alone could curb Medicaid costs, the Budget Control and
Reform Act of 1989 (BCRA) would have resolved this problem. This legislation included
over 20 sections, the intent of which was to reduce the skyrocketing trend -- giving
responsible Medicaid administrators additional contractual authority to control costs,
giving them limited power to approve Medicaid rates, establishing needs-based criteria
for new health providers, requiring certain relatives of Medicaid recipients to pay 2% of
nursing home costs, revising rate formulas to emphasize cost-effectiveness and
establishing managed-care programs.
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The general appropriations act for FY91 contained another round of some 20
outside sections affecting Medicaid, with an emphasis on programmatic and
administrative reforms and jump-starting the implementation of reforms delineated in the
BCRA, e.g., imposing an independent audit of the Medicaid program (costs, receivables,
payables, cost-effectiveness of cost-saving efforts); requiring the Medicaid program to
adopt by January 1, 1991 an accrued liability accounting system; directing the Medicaid
program to adopt a management information system that identifies cost and utilization
patterns for each category of program beneficiary and by health care provider
categories and setting criteria and reporting requirements; requiring the Medicaid
program to enroll all beneficiaries in managed care programs by January 1, 1991,
assuming that federal waivers are received; authorizing the Medicaid program to
contract for specialized, high-cost, high technology services with acute care hospitals
and to require exclusive use of such services by beneficiaries; prohibiting the Medicaid
program from providing options not mandated by federal law. 7
Other outside sections of this year's appropriation act mandated that the state's
public health and mental health agencies implement inpatient screening for all Medicaid
recipients under age 21 admitted to private psychiatric hospitals except for court-ordered
admissions and require the Medicaid program to implement a comprehensive strategy to
control private psychiatric hospital payments for persons under age 21. Concern over
the rising costs of pharmaceutical products prompted inclusion of an outside section
that authorized "sole and competitive bids" by the Medicaid program for drugs
dispensed to Medicaid patients in nursing homes and other institutions and creation of a
special commission to study the feasibility of a pharmaceutical manufacturers' rebate
program, a highly controversial issue.
7Such as adult dental services, except for dentures and emergency diagnostic and
restorative dental care, over-the-counter drugs prescribed for non-dependent children,
cosmetic surgery except as medically necessary, services of chiropractors, podiatrists or
social work interns except as medically necessary.
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If the myriad of legislative and administrative reforms fail in reducing and
maintaining annual Medicaid increases to 7% over the prior year as assumed in the fiscal
recovery plan, it may be necessary as a last resort to negotiate an annual lump sum
Medicaid authorization for internal allocation by major segments of the Medicaid-provider
community which is limited to the 7% annual cap increase. Massachusetts is only one of
a handful of states that offers all 32 Medicaid options to beneficiaries. It is one of a few
states that does not include a recipient's primary residence in the calculation of assets
for determining Medicaid eligibility.
Group Insurance Until now the principal reform to contain the escalating cost of Group
Insurance for active state employees and retirees, which had been the fastest growing
item in the state budget, has been the requirement of the BCRA that the state share of
the employer-employee cost-sharing arrangement should be limited to 90% of premiums
regardless of selected health plan. This basic change, supplemented by the downward
trend in health plan insurance participation from work force reductions, seems to be
having the desired effect. The FY91 appropriation for Group Insurance is 10.7% above
the prior year's estimated expenditure compared to the annual average of over 27% for
the prior four years.
Concerned that the changing Group Insurance participation pattern of more
family members and more elderly members, who generally need more expensive care,
exacerbated by Medical care inflation, expensive medical technology, a greater number
of catastrophic health claims, and higher costs of outpatient care, would outstrip savings
from implemented reform, the Legislature directed the Group Insurance Commission in
an outside section of the 1991 appropriations act to study the benefits, premiums, co-
payments and deductibles under current health insurance plans, making comparisons
with plans used in the private and governmental sectors and evaluating the cost
effectiveness of the current state indemnity plan and potential savings that might be
generated by utilization of preferred payer organizations (PPO's) and increased
managed care. (The study report must be filed by November 1, 1990.)
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In addition the Legislature imposed a freeze on adding new mandated benefits to
any available health insurance plans as an interim step to help curtail growth in Group
Insurance without affecting the current benefits package.
Transit Subsidies
Despite the strategies contained in the BCRA to curb the large annual increases in
state contractual assistance and debt service for the MBTA and other regional transit
authorities, the FY91 appropriation is 16% above last year's expenditures and these
subsidies have gone up by a yearly average of 17% since 1987. Aware of the fact that
the state's subsidy of the MBTA accounts for over three-quarters of its operating budget,
up from 55% in 1982, the Legislature had included provisions in the BCRA that the MBTA
raise at least one-third of its operating revenues through fares and related sources, that
capital spending be limited to $300 million a year, that MBTA employees pay at least 10%
of health insurance premiums, and that a study be undertaken of the MBTA's financing
structure.
Although the BCRA required the MBTA to implement a revenue-recovery ratio of
one-third from its own revenue sources, there has not been any fare adjustments to date
although an outside section of this year's budget act made possible an increase in the
senior citizen fare by eliminating language that the amount of such fare be specifically set
in the statute.
The mandated report on MBTA finances, released late in May 1990, contained a
limited number of revenue-enhancement and cost-saving recommendations. It
proposed $7 million in fare increases through either a small fare increase for all riders or
increases in fares for the elderly, disabled and students. It also proposed legislative
changes eliminating restrictions on MBTA purchases of electric power energy (estimated
savings of $2-3 million) and setting a $100,000 limit on tort liability cases against the
MBTA (estimated saving of $5 million.) These recommendations were not implemented
in outside sections of the appropriations act for FY91 , however.
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Other proposals in the MBTA financing report would restore the local operating
subsidy share of cities and towns in the MBTA district to 50% from the current 30% by
raising the MBTA assessments on 25 of the 78 cities and towns being served. This
would merely shift some of the cost burden from the state to municipalities. As for
substituting state forward funding for retroactive funding of the MBTA, the report
concluded that this would cost the state $600 million and should not be implemented
during a period of fiscal crisis.
Unless the Legislature limits the MBTA to an annual increase in state subsidy
capped at the index measuring the prices that state and local governments pay for
goods and services (an inflation rate), which we have currently estimated at 5%, and
demands on fare increases and related revenue changes that guarantee the one-third
revenue-recovery ratio, the transit subsidy budget buster will continue unabated.
Capping the MBTA costs through an inflation rate increase is consistent with our related
proposal that the annual limit on the property tax levy be raised from the current 2.5% to
such an inflation rate.
Debt Service
If the Commonwealth in FY92 and subsequent years borrows less for capital
improvements than it pays off in debt by eliminating and/or deferring all low-priority
outlays previously authorized and will continue this policy over the next three years, the
state should realize a gradual decline in the annual cost of debt service. Moreover, by
using receipts from expanded sales of surplus state properties to finance some needed
capital outlays, the state can further reduce its borrowing requirements. In the next few
years, however, the annual cost of debt service will continue to rise. In FY92, for
example, the cost of principal and interest on the loan to cover the prior year deficit will
account for over 20% of the state's total debt service requirements for that year.
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Pensions
Legislation of 1987 established a new pension payment schedule as part of a
fully-funded system thereby easing annual pension expense requirements during the
early years. However, the shift deferred the cost impacts of the new system until the
21st century.
The Politically Easier Way Means Budget Distortions
Over the past three years, the Administration and Legislature have carried out a
spending strategy that essentially balances budgets by chipping away at the so-called
discretionary items, accounting for about half of the state's expenditure budget, while
treating the budget busters, that consume two out of every five revenue dollars, as
legally-bound commitments requiring longer-term restructuring. To date, efforts to enact
and implement fundamental changes in entitlements, contractual arrangements,
subsidies and fixed charges have been limited to trimming their budget allocations
around the edges, and to mandating gradual revisions through the use of outside
budget sections while avoiding basic overhaul of their authorizing legislation.
As tax revenue collections have fallen below projections and the Administration
has been forced to scale back current year appropriations by over $700 million within a
brief 3-month period after their original enactment, the more recent budget reductions
indicate that slowing down the upward rates of spending has given way to more drastic
budget decisions with telling impact on the availability, volume and quality of services
rendered. One must speculate whether this is political "blood letting" or informed,
compassionate choices among the state's priorities.
This overall budget strategy, for example, has reduced state support for higher
education from FY88 to FY91 by $125 million, a cut of over 16% Direct local aid is 12%
below the level of two years ago. Home care for the elderly is down by 15% over 1989.
There are substantially fewer subsidized day care slots than two years ago. Swimming
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pools were closed this past summer. State scholarship assistance has been scaled
down by about 20%. By the end of the 1990 calendar year, the state payroll will be
leaner by about 7,500 employees or 9% over July 1988. Workforce reductions have
particularly affected the Governor's office, the Legislature, several constitutional offices
(Attorney-General, Auditor and Secretary of State), the Department of Education,
Communities and Development, Public Health, Public Works and the state police.
Meanwhile, welfare recipients and state retirees have gone three years without
cost-of-living adjustments. State employees have been working without collective
bargaining agreements for 18 months and state agency managers have not had salary
increases since 1986.
Administration and legislative initiatives to slow down the upward spiral of
spending growth of both the budget busters and discretionary budget accounts have
been impeded by the following examples of executive and/or legislative reluctance to act
boldly and in concert:
1
.
The badly-needed consolidation of the state's health care programs, including
Medicaid, into a new Secretariat, as recommended by an outside panel appointed by the
Governor and implemented through an outside section of the 1991 appropriations act,
was at least temporarily derailed by the Governor's decision to return this section for
amendment by substituting a new Department of Health within the Executive Office of
Human Services, thereby perpetuating an unwieldy bureaucratic behemoth responsible
for over 40% of the state's operating budget.
2. Legislative resistance to the consolidation of the state's sworn police forces
despite the Governor's recommendation to carry out this long overdue reform.
3. Legislative resistance to delegating powers over the number of district courts, the
deployment of court resources and control over court system facilities, finances,
personnel and operations so that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court and
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other legally-designated court administrators can re-structure the court system to meet
changing needs, enhance cost/effectiveness, reduce cost disparities among individual
courts and improve the administration of justice.
4. Not yet in place, because it lacks vigorous executive and legislative endorsement,
is a performance measurement system applicable to human services that defines
objectives in programmatic and measurable terms and is used to evaluate client services
and areas of need.
Harder Choices: Up to the Next State Administration
Although the Governor has pledged that he will leave office with the
Commonwealth in good fiscal shape, recent events and future projections indicate that
the Commonwealth's fiscal problems will persist and are likely to dominate state
concerns over the near term in the face of a weakening economy, despite record-high
borrowing to cover budget deficits, despite huge tax increases and despite sporadic
cost-cutting efforts.
Whether or not the state's voters approve the CLT-High Tech initiative petition that
would roll back up to $2.3 billion in revenues and/or the petition of the Massachusetts
Municipal Association, that would require 40% of the state's largest taxes to be paid
annually to cities and towns as local aid (thereby increasing local aid by $1.2 billion in
FY92), the next Administration and Legislature cannot avoid putting every expenditure
"on the table" and raising tough questions about everything the state does and spends
money for:
Who should be eligible for Medicaid and for state support in nursing homes when
the proportion of elderly in Masachusetts nursing homes is far above the national
average and when Massachusetts spends much more than the national average for
nursing home Medicaid patients?
How many of the Medicaid options should be provided when only a handful of
states including Massachusetts provides a full menu of options?
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When will mentally retarded patients be shifted from institutions to community-
based facilities after 25 years of state policy emphasizing deinstitutionalization?
Whether MBTA fares, lowest of any urban transit system in the nation, should be
raised to cover at least one-third of MBTA expenses?
Whether the state should continue to operate zoos in view of its poor
performance and limited resources?
Whether our current networks of two-year and four-year state colleges require
institutional consolidation in view of the state's declining college-age population and the
need for less duplication and more cost-effectiveness.
Whether a publicly subsidized maritime academy is warranted when the state no
longer has significant maritime economic interests?
Whether state subsidy for the professional education of veterinarians in a private
institution is justifiable as public policy?
Whether the missions of a sworn Capitol Police force, essentially providing
building security services, should be re-examined in the context of an escalating demand
for more crime-fighting police officers?
Whether the number and distribution of 70 district courts is outdated in light of
changes in population densities, transportation access and caseloads?
Until now the tendency has been to reduce budgets by merely doing what has
been done for fewer service recipients or with smaller appropriations. A variety of
explanations have been offered as to why major reforms cannot be undertaken, i.e. it will
take more money to save money; the Legislature will not amend the authorizing statute;
the affected client group is too large and too vocal. Such excuses wear thin as time
grows short.
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